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   Recruitment and Retention in British Army Reserve Logistics Units 
The British Army is currently in a period of the most significant organisational transformation 
since the abolition of conscription in 1957. Driven by financial, and to a lesser-extent, 
strategic imperatives, how the army perceives its future missions and how it organisationally 
orientates itself toward fulfilling them is changing. There are many facets to these ongoing 
reforms – known as Army 2020 – the most profound of which is the reduction in regular army 
manpower from 102,000 in 2010 to 82,000 by 2020 (MoD, 2012). A large proportion of these 
cuts to the regular army have been focused on Combat Service Support (CSS, or logistics) 
personnel. Such a reduction in personnel has resulted in changes to the structure and 
readiness of the army, and in particular, a renewed emphasis on the integration of the Army 
Reserve (AR); the rebranded Territorial Army (TA). As part of the Army 2020 reforms, the 
AR has been put on a tiered and rotational readiness system similar to that used by the US 
Army.  
To deliver the greater capability required of the AR under Army 2020, the Ministry of 
Defence’s (MoD) Consultation Paper, Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s 
Security Together (FR20), outlined significant changes to the role and size of the AR. While 
previous research has discussed how the TA has been utilised to date (Dandeker et al., 
2009), FR20 marked a major change to the AR’s role within British defence, changing it from 
a strategic to an operational reserve force. It will now be required to deploy routinely on 
operations and defence engagement tasks with and without the regulars. Perhaps most 
importantly, FR20 seeks to offset the reduction in regular personnel with a more deployable 
force of 30,000 army reservists. This requires the recruitment of over 10,000 new AR 
soldiers by 2019. It has also pledged to spend £1.8 billion between 2013-23 on pay, 
recruitment, equipment, and better training and support for reservists in a bid to both attract 
new recruits, retain existing soldiers, and thereby raise the capability of the reserves to meet 
the new deployment demands (MoD, 2013). However, the drive to recruit has proved 
problematic, despite the FR20’s initial introduction of increased remuneration and welfare 
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packages (‘Army reservists to get military pensions and healthcare benefits’, The Guardian, 
3 July 2013). With the public proving resistant to joining in numbers required, more recently 
numerous joining bonuses for new reservists of £2,300, and other bonuses for ex-regulars 
joining the reserves of up to £10,000, have been introduced (‘£10,000 for troops to join 
reserves’, The Daily Mail, 3 April 2014). The failure to recruit in the numbers required, and 
then need to the increase the reservist ‘offer’, raised questions about the overall efficiency of 
a greater reliance on the reserve. While the new measures have increased inflow, interviews 
with reservists have revealed that these bonuses have caused concerns about the 
commitment of those joining the reserve under these enhanced terms. (Group and individual 
interviews; 13 June and 11 July 2015.) Thus, the better pecuniary benefits on offer raise the 
question whether the AR is recruiting the personnel with the right kind of commitment to 
meet its increased readiness burden. In short, is recruiting occupationally-oriented soldiers 
organisationally effective for the AT? 
Within this context, personal communication with senior army officers has indicated 
that due to the cuts in regular CSS capability, one of the greatest risks to successfully 
implementing FR20 lies with the reserve logistics component, and within this group, 
specifically in Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) and Royal Logistics Corps 
(RLC) units (senior army officer, personal communication, 16 January 2014). The regular 
RLC lost two regiments as result of Army 2020, while the REME lost one battalion (BBC, 
2012). The regular army is thus increasingly dependent on reserve RLC/REME units to 
provide outsourced logistics capability. These units need to be fully manned and will deploy 
more frequently to deliver such capability. Reserve RLC and REME recruitment and 
retention is therefore central to the success of FR20, and by extension, Army 2020. To 
examine these areas of policy interest, this study uses the institutional-occupational (I-O) 
model to generate survey data on why these reservists join and remain in their units. Were 
possible data has been corroborated by individual and group interviews. This also allows the 
question of commitment to reserve service to be addressed. It also contributes original data 
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on attitudes towards recruitment, reasons for deploying, and retention in the AR in general. 
In doing so, it addresses issues central to current British defence policy, and those 
concerning the I-O model. 
Institutional - Occupational Motivations for Military Service 
In 1977, Charles Moskos first put forward his theory that individual soldiers joined the 
professional US military for two reasons: institutional and occupational. While initially 
Moskos viewed these motivation orientations as mutually exclusive, he later accepted that 
both could influence reasons for joining, with one usually more ascendant than the other 
(Moskos, 1977; 1988). For Moskos, institutional motivational orientations include often 
intrinsic personal reasons for joining the military to experience military life, be challenged, or 
to serve one’s country. These intrinsic motivations are sustained by organisational norms 
and practises within the military that foster a sense of personal loyalty and duty toward 
military service. Moskos proposed that soldiers who join for institutional reasons overcome 
adversities associated with military service, such as long work hours or deployments, 
through high levels of personal commitment to the military institution. He argued that these 
institutional motivations had been predominant until the professionalisation of the US military 
in the 1970s. Conversely, Moskos argued that occupational orientations for joining the 
military are similar to those one would expect to find in civilian employment, and these have 
become more apparent with the professionalisation of Western militaries (King, 2013). He 
argued that an occupational orientation views military service as clearly defined work and 
tasks, and expects that any adverse impacts of service are expected to be compensated for 
by material or other benefits. Moskos’ institutional-occupational (I-O) framework for joining 
and remaining in military service has been found to be useful in explaining recruitment and 
retention in the US (Moore, 2002) and other militaries (Cotton, 1981). In particular, using 
factor analyses Eighmey (2006) and Woodruff, Kelty, & Segal (2006) found that I-O 
motivations helped explain variance in responses amongst US youth and regular combat 
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soldiers. It has also been compliment by organisational commitment research (Meyer and 
Allen, 1991) 
The I-O Model and Reserve Recruitment and Retention 
In a paper published in this journal Griffith (2007) applied Moskos’ I-O framework to examine 
reserve soldiers in a US Army National Guard division, which included logistics personnel. 
Griffith found that four underlying factors explained these soldiers’ motivations for joining: 
wanting to experience military life; wanting material benefits; wanting occupational 
development and wanting future opportunities. These factors were similar to Woodruff et 
al.’s (2006), and Griffith found that a greater percentage of his sample joined to experience 
military life compared to other reasons. He found that joining motivations ‘accounted for 
significant and relatively large amounts of variance in career intentions in Guard soldiers’ (R2 
change = 12 percent) (Griffith, 2007 p. 249). Griffith also examined the relationship between 
reasons for joining and leaving the Guard, finding that soldiers’ reasons for leaving were 
broadly consistent with the I-O framework. Overall, Griffith argued that the I-O model helped 
explain recruitment and retention motivations in the National Guard. Decisively, he 
concluded that institutional joining motivations were correlated with soldiers who were more 
committed to reserve service and that this benefited recruitment and retention and 
deployability. As a result, he argued that emphasising institutional elements in recruitment 
campaigns may prove more cost effective in the long term (p. 253). Griffith’s findings were 
broadly supported by subsequent longitudinal research on Army National Guard soldiers 
(Griffith, 2008 p.227-236). 
In the British context, reserve recruitment and retention is particularly worthy of 
examination at present as there have been major challenges to increasing the trained 
strength of the AR. At the beginning of the implementation of FR20 in 2013 the trained 
strength of the AR was 19,410 (MoD, 2014b). While the latest figures show it was 21,030 by 
early 2015 (MoD, 2015b), the majority of this figure has been increased by the 2015 
inclusion of certain groups that were excluded in 2013 (MoD, 2015b p. 7). Indeed in 2014, 
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with these groups excluded, the trained strength had actually declined to 19,400 (MoD, 
2014b), indicating high rates of outflow. At that rate, an extra 2,750 trained reservists a year 
are needed to hit the target of 30,000 by the end of 2018 (Neville, 2014). While there is 
evidence that recruitment is increasing, the recent claims of the Minister for Reserve Forces 
that ‘current strengths are running ahead of schedule’ is questionable (Hansard, 2015). 
Indeed, at present, it appears that this target will not be met on time. This is despite having 
spent £50 million outsourcing recruitment to a specialist firm (Colville, 2014), as well as 
spending millions on intensive television and press recruitment campaigns (Drury, 2014). 
The introduction of new IT systems have also caused both regular and reserve recruitment 
to suffer (Government, 2014, 10). Furthermore, numerous reserve recruitment and retention 
bonuses have been introduced, including a £10,000 bonus for ex-regulars who join the 
reserves (MoD, 2015a), while the entry requirements have also been changed to attract 
more recruits (Johnson, 2014). Clearly then, FR20 has proved a challenge in terms of 
recruitment and retention.    
As a result of this challenge, and of the outsourcing of logistics capability to the 
reserves, recruitment and retention in the AR REME and RLC provides a useful case study 
for examining key questions relating to the FR20 policy. In particular, how are reasons for 
joining related to recruitment strategies? Moreover, as recent recruitment campaigns have 
emphasise occupational benefits over institutional motivations, will they attract the right kind 
of recruit? And how are such strategies related to outcomes of interest, such as manning a 
more ready and deployable force, and the long-term retention of reservists? This study 
seeks to address these questions. 
A search of databases of academic literature revealed only one recent publication 
directly concerning recruitment in the British Army (Dandeker & Strachan, 1993). Moreover, 
a review of the literature revealed a lack of recent, sociological research on the TA (Beckett, 
1982, 2008; Cunningham, 1975; Mitchinson, 2005, 2008, 2014; Walker, 1990)  Similarly, the 
MoD’s annual Reserve Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey (ResCAS) only began collecting 
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data on soldiers’ reasons for leaving and joining in 2015, and while there are presently some 
army-led, and other MoD-approved research projects looking at reserve recruitment, these 
do not focus on the logistics component specifically, and are in their early stages.1 The 
exception is Dandeker et al.’s (2009) small scale study of soldiers’ reasons for leaving the 
TA after service in Iraq between 2003-6. Given this lack of published research on the AR, 
this study follows Moskos’ I-O framework, and the methodological approach used by Griffith 
(2007). 
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
The study was instigated by the one-star Capabilities Director, CSS (CD CSS), in order to 
better understand recruitment, retention, and readiness issues in AR RLC and REME units. 
This is important because these units are required be fully manned and more deployable 
under FR20. The intent was to produce statistically significant findings reflective of the wider 
AR RLC/ REME population that could be used to inform policy as attempts are made to grow 
this component to meet the requirements laid out in FR20. Following previous research on 
the US National Guard, but addressing major gaps in the literature on the British reserves, 
statistical analysis utilising the I-O is used to examine these questions. As such, the study 
set out to achieve the following two aims: 
a. Apply the institutional-occupational model to reasons for joining; reasons for 
reporting when mobilised; career intentions and reasons for leaving amongst 
reserve RLC and REME personnel in order to better understand the implications 
for their recruitment, retention and readiness as a result of FR20.  
b. Use the sample to contribute to better understanding of the I-O model. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutionally-motivated REME/RLC soldiers – contrasted with 
occupationally-oriented soldiers – will show greater commitment to military service.  
                                                          
1 As well as the introduction of the ResCAS survey in 2014, the army is also collecting data on the success of its 
Army Reserve recruitment drive, known as Operation Fortify. For details on the four studies of reserve service, 
see http://www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk 
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Sub-hypotheses: 
 1a: Institutionally-oriented soldiers will mobilise out of a sense of duty rather than 
contractual obligation.  
1b: Institutionally-oriented soldiers will intend to remain in service longer.  
1c: Institutionally-oriented soldiers will be more satisfied with reserve service overall. 
Hypothesis   2: Contrasting institutionally-oriented soldiers, those with occupational 
orientations are more likely to leave the reserves. 
Sample Description 
Those surveyed were reserve RLC and REME personnel, including a small number of 
attached Adjutant General’s Corps (AGC) personnel. Members of 8 reserve RLC regiments 
and 6 REME battalions were approached. To ensure a varied sample these were chosen for 
their geographic spread across the UK, but other than this selection was random. 
Approximately 2,000 personnel (from a total population of 4,600) were approached to 
participate, and there were 179 valid electronic responses and 405 valid paper responses, 
totalling 584 responses. The approximate response rate was 29 percent, which is consistent 
with the latest ResCAS survey (31 percent, MoD, 2015). The confidence level was 95 
percent, with a confidence interval of 3.79. RLC personnel represented 73.2 percent of 
responses and REME 23.6. This is representative of the reserve RLC/REME population. 
With missing data excluded pairwise, a chi square test for goodness-of-fit confirmed this (1, 
n = 545) = .1, p = .75. The unit with the highest number of responses contributed to 20 
percent of total responses, while the lowest contributed 0.2 percent. The average 
contribution per unit was 7.2 percent. Varied responses rates reflect different emphasises 
placed by unit commanders on participation, and also the training schedule of units. Varied 
unit response rates, and in particular the 20 percent contribution, may have skewed data, but 
the relatively strong total response rate mitigated this somewhat. Although the relatively 
small sample size was potentially problematic for future factor analysis, it should be 
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emphasised that the main research aims were to apply the I-O model to data representative 
from the AR RLC/REME population. 
Table 1 
Background Characteristics Comparison with Army Reserve Population 
Background Characteristic Sample Total Volunteer Reserve,  including Army Reserve Gp A 
Gender     
Male 87.5  % 86.9 % 
Female 12.5  % 13.1 % 
Age Gp     
18-24 15.9 % 15.3 % 
25-34 27.1 % 29.8 % 
35-44 28.0 % 26.3 % 
45-54 26.7 % 24.2 % 
55-64 2.3 % 4.2 % 
Rank     
Officers 7.1 % 18.7 % 
Other Ranks 92.9 % 81.3 % 
Source: MoD Statistics, Reserves and Cadets: 1 April 2014 
Generally, the distributions of age and gender in the sample were similar to figures 
available for the AR (MoD, 2014). The rank most represented was Private Soldier, with 40 
percent of responses. This was representative of the wider reserve RLC/REME population 
and important as a high number of junior soldiers’ responses are crucial to understanding 
recruitment and retention in the wake of FR20. 
Method: Survey Design and Administration 
The questionnaire consisted of 30 questions with a total of 96 items. Relevant questions 
were taken directly from Griffith (2007), with some minor adjustments made to his 
questionnaire due to differences between National Guard and British Army Reserve terms of 
service. Firstly, a list of reasons for joining and leaving reserve service were presented in 
which soldiers indicated ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each reason, coded 1 or 0.2 Participants were then 
asked questions about their career intentions. Possible answers were on a five-point Likert 
                                                          
2 This use of a dichotomous variable followed Griffith, but a Likert scale could be reconsidered in future 
studies. 
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scale ranging from 1= ‘Very dissatisfied/Strongly disagree’; 2 = ‘Dissatisfied/Disagree’; 3 = 
‘Neutral’; 4 = ‘Satisfied/Agree’; and 5 = ‘Very satisfied/Strongly agree’.  
Analytic Approach 
The purpose of the study was to address the two research aims and to test the specific 
hypotheses stated earlier. To do this, several separate multiple regression analyses 
corresponding to each outcome variable were conducted. Multiple regressions asses the 
relationship between the each predictor variable and the outcome variable, whilst controlling 
for all other predictor variables entered into the model. Outcome, or dependent variables 
included career intentions and reasons for leaving (retention), and reasons for reporting 
when mobilised (readiness). Each outcome variable was operationally defined as responses 
to one or more survey items, as discussed below. Predictor, or independent variables 
included soldier background characteristics, which served as control variables. Other 
predictor variables were derived from factor analyses of reasons for joining. Table 1 displays 
each of the predictor and outcome variables, along with their corresponding operational 
definitions and separate factor analysis scores. 
Predictor Variables 
Soldier Background: Categories and coding for soldiers’ background characteristics closely 
followed Griffith (2007, p. 238) and served as control variables in the multiple regression 
analyses. To understand whether particular groups of soldiers’ joined reserve service for 
specific reasons, linear regression analyses were then conducted in which the factor scales 
for the four joining motivations were regressed onto gender, age, education status, marital 
status (single or other), rank, year last mobilised, frequency of attending training and being in 
the RLC/REME (cap badge).  
Reasons for Joining: Reasons for joining reserve service were taken directly from Griffith 
(2007). These broadly follow Moskos’ I-O model. One item was added – ‘to deploy on 
operations’. Of the 14 reasons, soldiers responded ‘yes/no’ to each reason, with ‘yes’ coded 
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as 1 and ‘no’ as 0. These responses were later factor analysed to derive the underlying 
relationships between them and to create summary constructs. 
The first research question was to examine whether Moskos’, Woodruff et al.’s and 
Griffith’s enlistment I-O motivations could be observed in British AR RLC and REME 
soldiers. To examine this, these soldiers’ responses to reasons for joining the AR underwent 
EFA.i With an eigenvalue set at 1, three major factors emerged, contributing 31.8 and 13.4 
and 7.9 percent of total variance, respectively. An inspection of the screeplot revealed a 
break after the fourth factor, and using Catell’s Scree Test, it was decided to retain four 
factors for further examination. The last factor had an eigenvalue of .984, and contributed 
7.6 percent of variance. In total, 60.7 percent of variance was explained. These four factors 
labelled were institutional – wanting to experience military life; institutional – serve country 
and other; occupational – pecuniary; and occupational – development. An average 
percentage of soldiers who agreed with items on each factor was then calculated. Next, the 
arrangement of items on the factors implied by the EFA underwent confirmatory factor 
analysis using Amos 22 software. Table 2 below indicates the regressions of the 
questionnaire items onto the latent constructs. While the items on the institutional factors 
were similar to those described as ‘wanting military life’ by Griffith, conversely, two factors of 
institutional motivations for joining reserve service were identified. The CFA confirmed the 
statistical significance of the four factor model.ii The summary joining motivations were then 
used in subsequent analyses as factor scores.  
Outcome Variables 
The study employed several outcomes of policy interest, including RLC/REME soldiers’ 
reasons for joining the AR; career intentions and reasons for leaving; and reasons for 
deploying when mobilised. 
Career intentions: To determine how long soldiers intended to stay in the reserve they were 
asked two questions. Firstly, to establish the relationship between time in service and career 
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intentions, soldiers were asked to choose the category closest to how long they had served. 
Categories included: 0-11 months, 1-3 years, 4-6 years, 7-9 years, 10-12 years,13-15 years, 
16-18 years, 19-21 years and 21 years or more. These were then grouped into the lowest 
and highest categories to better inform policy. 47.3 percent of the RLC fell into the 0-6 years 
category, indicating a young population, but only 30.3 percent of REME respondents were in 
the same category. Meanwhile, 27.5 percent of the RLC were in the 16-21 years or more 
category, while 46.3 percent of REME soldiers were in this category. Respondents were also 
asked how long they intended to stay in the reserves. The categories were: Not sure (coded 
as missing), less than 1 year (1) 1-2 years (2), 3-4 years (3), 5-6 years (4), 7 years or more 
(5). The majority of soldiers (46.7 percent) intended to serve for seven years or more, with 
21 percent undecided as to how long they would serve.  
Table 2: Predictor and Outcome Variables 
Construct Measure Specific Items Respective Rotated 
Component Factor 
Analyses Scores  
Predictor 
Variables 
   
Latent Construct: 
Institutional 
orientation 
Scales derived from factor 
analysis of reasons for joining: 
Wanting to experience military 
life 
 
 
 
Serve country and other 
 
Responded yes-no to: 
 
Experience military training 
Experience military life  
Learn skills different to civilian job 
Develop discipline and confidence 
 
Serve country 
Have friends in the military  
Be physically and mentally challenged 
Be recognised and promoted 
Experience overseas training and travel 
opportunities 
 
 
.82 
.79 
.71 
.51 
 
.73 
.62 
.61 
.60 
 
.51 
Latent Construct: 
Occupational 
orientation 
Scales derived from factor 
analysis of reasons for joining: 
Occupational – pecuniary  
 
 
Occupational – development 
 
 
Earn money  
Receive bonus money 
 
Obtain educational benefits  
Develop civilian job skills  
 
 
.90 
.88 
 
.79 
.80 
Soldier 
background 
Gender 
Age 
Single 
Education attained 
Rank 
Year last mobilised 
RLC/REME/AGC 
Responses to individual questions  
Outcome 
Variables 
   
Career intentions Self-reported intention as to 
length of service 
Responded: Not sure, 1-2 years, 3-4 
years, 5-6 years, 7 years or more 
 
Reasons for 
leaving 
Scales derived from factor 
analysis for reasons for leaving: 
Poor leadership and boring 
Responded yes-no to: 
 
Leaders don’t look out for soldiers 
 
 
.75 
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training 
 
 
 
 
 
Occupational – pecuniary 
 
 
 
Occupational – development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of deployments and 
opportunities to work with 
regulars 
 
Too many deployments 
 
 
Conflicts between reserve service 
and civilian life 
Leaders lack military skills 
Boring training 
Too much time waiting around 
Working on unnecessary things 
Lack of promotion 
 
Lack of pay 
Bounty pay not enough 
Pay problems 
 
Unable to acquire civilian job skills 
Not enough educational benefits 
Few overseas travel and training 
opportunities 
Not enough physical and mental 
challenges 
 
 
Not enough  deployments 
Not enough training with regulars 
 
 
Possibility of being deployed  
Lengthy periods of being deployed 
 
Conflicts between reserve service and 
civilian job 
Conflicts between reserve service and 
family life 
.74 
.72 
.63 
.70 
.45 
 
.79 
.80 
.71 
 
.75 
.73 
 
.51 
 
.51 
 
 
.86 
.82 
 
 
.87 
.83 
 
 
.82 
 
.82 
Reasons for 
reporting 
Self-reported agreement with 
reasons when asked: ‘When and 
if you are called to mobilise and 
deploy to support operations, you 
would go because…?’ 
Responded in 5 point agreement to: 
Because your enlistment contract 
requires it 
So that you do not receive disciplinary 
action 
Not to let your family down  
Because you want to do your job on 
operations 
To serve your country 
Because you need the money  
To do your job on operations 
 
 
Reasons for Leaving: Another set of outcomes related to soldiers’ self-reported reasons for 
leaving the AR. Soldiers were asked whether nineteen potential conditions would cause 
them to leave and their responses reasons then underwent EFA to identify underlying 
themes in order to relate these to the I-O model.iii Six factors emerged which accounted for 
25.7, 9.7, 8.4, 7.0, 5.8, and 5.6 percent of total variance, respectively and 62.2 percent in 
total. The factors were ‘Poor leadership and boring training’; ‘Occupational – pecuniary’; 
‘Occupational – development’; ‘Lack of deployments and opportunities to work with regulars’; 
‘Too many deployments’; and ‘Conflicts between reserve service and civilian life’. Their 
respective items and loadings are detailed in Table 2 above. In order to examine the 
predictive ability of I-O joining motivations on intentions to remain in service and these 
reasons for leaving reserve service, separate multiple regression analyses, each 
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corresponding to one of these outcomes, were conducted. Predictor variables were soldier 
background characteristics and the four I-O joining motivations.  
Reasons for Reporting when Mobilised: The AR will be more deployable under Army 2020, 
and to investigate the implications of potentially increased deployment demands on 
reservists, soldiers were asked about their reasons for reporting when mobilised. Soldiers 
were asked ‘When and if you are called to mobilise and deploy to support operations, you 
would go because…’ Soldiers then indicated the strength of agreement with several reasons 
on a 5-point Likert scale. These included: ‘Because your enlistment contract requires it’; ‘so 
that you do not receive disciplinary action’; ‘not to let your family down’; ‘because you want 
to do your job on operations’; ‘to serve your country;’ and ‘because you need the money.’iv  
Results 
Underlying Reasons for Joining Reserve Service 
Table 3 presents the basic percentage of respondents that agreed that each reason had 
influenced their decision to join the reserves. When combined, a greater percentage joined 
to experience military life (76.2 percent) and serve country/other (75.5 percent) than for 
occupational – pecuniary (62.7 percent) and occupational – development (50.5 percent) 
reasons. This is a useful baseline statistic in terms of understanding why RLC/REME 
soldiers join the reserves. It indicates that a higher percentage of soldiers listed institutional 
reasons over occupational reasons as motivating them to join the reserves. Of note is the 16 
percent difference between the most frequently listed institutional reason (to be physically 
and mentally challenged) and the highest occupational reason (earn money). In considering 
the rest of the percentages, there are higher scores throughout the institutional factors; 
indeed earning money only had a higher percentage than the two lowest scoring institutional 
factors. There is therefore a clear trend that soldiers more frequently cite institutional over 
occupational factors in their decision to join, and that being challenged and serving one’s 
country are the two most frequently reported reasons for joining the reserves. This has 
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potentially significant implications for the FR20 recruitment model, which has stressed the 
occupational benefits of reserve service. 
Table 3: Basic Reasons for Joining 
Measure Specific Items Percentage responded 
‘yes’  
 
 
Wanting to experience military 
life 
 
 
 
Serve country and other 
 
Responded yes-no to: 
 
Experience military training 
Experience military life  
Learn skills different to civilian job 
Develop discipline and confidence 
 
Serve country 
Have friends in the military  
Be physically and mentally  challenged 
Be recognised and promoted 
Experience overseas training and travel 
opportunities 
 
 
81 
77.1 
74.1 
72.6 
 
85.1 
61.5 
85.5 
66.4 
 
78.9 
Occupational – pecuniary  
 
Occupational – development 
Earn  money  
Receive bonus money 
 
Obtain educational benefits  
Develop civilian job skills  
62.7 
56.3 
 
43.2 
57.7 
 
Soldier Background and Joining Motivations 
The results of the soldier background and joining motivations regressions are detailed in 
Table 4. Taking into account differences in measurement and responses, the overall R2 of 
the four joining motivations was roughly .25. These indicated that lower-ranked soldiers are 
more associated with joining for institutional – to experience military life reasons (-.16, p < 
.001). This is a relatively strong relationship that is very highly significant to the wider 
population. Soldiers who attended training more frequently were also relatively strongly 
associated with having joined for this reason also, at highly significant levels (.18. p < .01). 
Being less educated was the only background characteristic statistically associated with 
institutional – serve country/other reasons for joining at significant levels (-.10, p < .05). 
Soldiers who had deployed less recently, or not at all, were very slightly associated with 
occupational – pecuniary reasons for joining at highly significant levels (-0.03, p < .01). As 
expected, soldiers with less education were associated with joining for occupational – 
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development reasons at very significant levels, as were lower ranks (-.08, p < .01; -.08, p < 
.01, respectively). Soldiers who had been less deployed were also slightly associated with 
joining for occupational development reasons at significant levels (-.02, p < .05). 
Table 4: Regression Analyses in which Soldier Background Predicts Reasons for 
Joining 
Predictor 
Variables 
Institutional – Experience 
Military Life 
Institutional – Serve 
Country/ 
Other 
Occupational – 
Pecuniary 
Occupational –
Development 
    Unstnd coeff B   
  
Male -.26 -.12 .03 -.03 
Age .12 -.03 -.10 -.01 
Single .27 .19 -.06 .15 
Education -.04 -.10* -.02 -.08** 
Rank -.16*** -.06 .02 -.08** 
Year mobilised -.01 -.02 -.03** -.02* 
Freq training .18** .11 .14 .02 
RLC .23 -.08 .07 .07 
REME -.19 -.15 -.06 .17 
AGC correlated 0 -.03 -.07 -.20 
R2 .09 .04 .04 .08 
F, df               9, 464           9, 464           9, 464           9, 464 
 =               5.24***                              1.99*                    2.12*         4.41*** 
*p < .05, two tailed; **p < .01, two tailed; ***p < .001, two tailed 
In terms of informing recruitment and retention policy, these findings suggest that 
there is no statistically significant difference between reasons for joining the reserve between 
RLC/REME/AGC soldiers. The relationship between lower ranks and those attending 
training more frequently with joining to experience military life indicates that recruitment 
campaigns that emphasise the institutional experiential benefits of military service will likely 
resonate with reserve logistics recruits, whilst also indicating that soldiers who join for this 
reason are more committed to training. This is an important statistic as it may indicate that 
intrinsic institutional reasons for joining produce more committed reserve logistics soldiers; it 
is also consistent with the previous literature. Appeals to patriotism are also likely to be 
particularly effective with less-educated potential reserve logisticians. In terms of 
occupational motivations for joining, less educated soldiers are also more likely to be 
motivated by campaigns that stress the educational and career development opportunities 
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associated with reserve service, as are lower ranked soldiers. Although very weak, a 
significant relationship does exist between reserve logistics soldiers that join for monetary 
benefits and a lack of deployment. This is unsurprising and supports hypotheses 1.  
Career Intentions and Reasons for Leaving Reserve Service 
The results in Table 5 below indicate the relationship between the I-O predictor variables 
and the career intention outcomes. Taking into account differences in measurement and 
responses, the overall R2 of the six reasons for leaving was roughly .39. REME soldiers 
were strongly associated at significant levels with intending to stay in the reserves longer 
(.50, p < .05). Soldiers who attended training more frequently were associated at very high 
levels of significance with remaining in the reserves for longer (.23, p < .001). These are to 
be expected. However, further supporting sub-hypothesis 1b, soldiers who joined to serve 
their country/other were relatively strongly associated (.24, p < .01) with intending to remain 
in service longer at high levels of significance. Joining for occupational - development 
reasons had a smaller but significant relationship with career intentions (.16, p <.05).   
Table 5: Regression Analyses in which Soldier Background and Enlistment 
Motivations Predict Career Intentions and Reasons for Leaving Reserve Service 
Predictor 
Variables 
How Long 
Stay in 
Reserves  
Leave Boring 
Trg/Leader 
Leave Lack 
Pec 
Leave Lack 
Occ Dev 
Leave Lack 
Deploy 
Too Many 
Deploy 
Conflict with 
Civ Life 
        
UnStnd 
coeff B       
Male -.13 .21 .16 .21 .12 -.07 .10 
Age -.04 0 .03 .02 -.05 .08* .05 
Single .05 -.24 -.08 .08 -.03 -.01 -.20* 
Education -.06 .15* 0 .16*** .03 -.01 .08** 
Rank .06 -.03 -.03 .01 -.07* -.03* .01 
Year mobilised .02 .06** .01 .02 .03*** -.01 .01 
Freq training .23*** -.35** -.12* -.22** -.05 -.02 -.12* 
RLC .75 -.06 .12 .11 -.13 .10 .23 
REME .50* .27 .08 .04 -.07 .07 .14 
R2 .06 .06 .02 .06 .07 .03 .06 
F, df               9, 351           9, 464    9, 464 9, 453 9, 461 9, 464        9, 464 
 = 
              
2.60**                         3.07** 
                   
1.01 
        
3.38***         3.62*** 1.30         3.33** 
        
Inst - Exp mil life .03 .02 -.10* -.01 -.02 .08 0 
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Inst - serve/other .23** .03 -.01 -03 .04 -.09 -.04 
Occ - pecuniary -.01 .11 .25*** .05 -.04 .06 .02 
Occ - 
development .16* -.24* .06 -.01 -.10* -.05 .01 
R2 .03 .01 .05 0 .01 .01 0 
F, df =                4, 402             4, 528     4, 531          4, 517        4, 526    4, 527           4,529 
 
                   
2.17                   1.10    7.38***              .32             1.76         1.32                .50 
        
Total R2 .09 .08 .07 .07 .07 .03 .07 
F,df = 13, 402 13, 464 13, 464 13, 453 13, 461 13, 464 13, 464 
 2.39** 2.09*** 4.20*** 1.85*** 2.69*** 1.31 1.91*** 
*p < .05, two tailed; **p < .01, two tailed; ***p < .001, two tailed 
In terms of reasons for leaving, background characteristics explained more variance 
than reasons for joining. At significant levels, those who had joined for occupational 
development reasons were less likely to leave due to boring training. Understandably, more 
educated soldiers were more likely to leave for this reason (.15, p < .05), as were soldiers 
more recently deployed. As expected, soldiers who joined to experience military life were 
less likely to leave due to a lack of pecuniary benefits (-.10, p < .05). Similarly, soldiers who 
joined for pecuniary reasons were associated at very high levels of significance with leaving 
due to a lack of pecuniary compensation (.25, p <.001). Both statistics support hypothesis 2. 
Soldiers who joined for occupational development reasons were also associated with leaving 
due to a lack of deployments. At much lower levels of significance but supporting hypothesis 
1, soldiers that joined for both of the institutional reasons were less likely to leave due to 
conflict with civilian life and a lack of pecuniary compensation. 
Further regressions examined the impact of I-O motivations on soldiers’ satisfaction 
with reserve service. Supporting hypothesis 1c, joining to serve one’s country/other was 
relatively strongly associated with being more satisfied with equipment at significant levels 
(.22, p < .05), while joining to experience military life was also relatively strongly associated 
with higher satisfaction with pecuniary benefits at significant levels (.30, p < .05). When 
lower levels of significance were examined, a trend was discernible, with soldiers who join 
for both institutional reasons consistently more satisfied than those who join for pecuniary 
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reasons, across these measures of satisfaction. Crucially, this may indicate that soldiers who 
join for institutional reasons are easier to retain, and supports sub-hypothesis 1b. 
Reasons for Mobilising 
Finally, in order to better understand soldiers’ reasons for reporting when mobilised, a series 
of multiple linear regressions were conducted using reasons for joining as predictor 
variables, and the self-reported reasons for mobilising as outcome variables. Inter-item 
correlations between responses to mobilising for contractual and disciplinary reasons were 
significantly correlated (.30, p <.01). Supporting hypothesis 1 and 2, responses to these two 
items were negatively correlated with deploying to serve country or wanting to do job on 
operations (-.14, p <.01, to -.57). Deploying to avoid disciplinary action was also significantly 
correlated with deploying due to needing the money (.35, p <.01). As expected, mobilising to 
do job on operations and serve country were also positively correlated (.44, p <.01). 
Table 6: Regression Analyses in which Soldier Background and Enlistment 
Motivations Predict Reasons for Reporting when Mobilised 
Predictor 
Variables 
Contract 
Requires 
Avoid Disciplinary 
Action 
Not Let Family 
Down 
Do Job on 
Ops 
Serve 
Country 
Need the 
Money 
      UnStnd coeff B  
 
    
Male .03 -.04 .32 .15 .07 .01 
Age -.02 -.17* -.09 .04 .05 -.22** 
Single .10 -.04 .09 .23* -.01 .06 
Education .04 .01 .03 .01 0 -.07 
Rank -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03 -.06 
Year mobilised -.01 -.03* -.02 .02** 0 .01 
Freq training -.04 -.06 -.07* -.02 .04 -.07 
RLC -.10 .09 .16 -.12 0 .25 
REME .05 -.16 -.02 -.09 -.06 .19 
AGC correlated 0 -.03 -.07 -.20 0 -.06 
R2 .01 .06 .04 .03 .01 .09 
F, df               9,464           9, 464    9, 464         9,464      9, 464 9, 464 
 =               .45                             3.03**                    1.89* 
        
1.75***         .32 5.07*** 
       
Inst - Exp mil life .09 -.03 0 .02 -.04 -.03 
Inst - serve/other -.07 0 .03 .08* .22*** -.06 
Occ -pecuniary .11 .22*** .17** -.08 -.10* .48 
Occ - development .01 .17* .10 -.01 -.08 -.05 
R2 .01 .05 .03 0 .08 .04 
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F, df =                4, 547             4, 539     4, 541          4, 550        4, 551    4, 543 
 
                   .92                   6.34    4.02** 
             
3.78** 
            
12.58***         17.34*** 
       
Total R2 .02 .09 .07 .03 .08 .13 
F,df = 13, 464 13, 464 13, 464 13, 464 13, 464 13, 464 
 .94 4.69*** 2.96** 2.77*** 6.45*** 11.21*** 
*p < .05, two tailed; **p < .01, two tailed; ***p < .001, two tailed 
 
The results are displayed in Table 6. Taking into account differences in measurement 
and responses, the overall R2 of the six reasons for reporting was roughly .42. In terms of 
underlying reasons for joining, and consistent with hypothesis 2, soldiers who joined for 
occupational – pecuniary reasons, and occupational – development reasons, were 
associated with reporting to avoid disciplinary action at very highly significant (.22, p < .001) 
and highly significant levels (.23, p < .01), respectively. Similarly, joining for pecuniary 
benefits was also negatively associated with mobilising to serve one’s country at significant 
levels (-.10, p < .05). Conversely, supporting hypothesis 1a, soldiers who joined for 
institutional reasons – to serve country/other, were associated with reporting for this reason 
at very high levels of significance (.22, p < .001). This evidence is consistent with Woodruff 
et al. (2006) and Griffith (2007, p. 251), and suggests that institutionally motivated soldiers 
are more likely to deploy for intrinsic reasons rather than for extrinsic reasons, such as 
contractual requirements, avoiding disciplinary action, and needing the money. Given that 
FR20 envisages a more deployable reserve, institutionally motivated reservists may 
therefore be potentially more reliable. Following Griffith (2008), it can also be posited that 
these soldiers are likely to perform more consistently on operations, due to the presence of 
these intrinsic motivations during periods of adversity. 
The I-O Model 
The second research aim was to use the sample to contribute to better understanding of the 
I-O model. Overall, the statistical significance of the model was very similar to that of 
Griffith’s. However, the presence of two institutional factors is interesting as this differs from 
Woodruff et al.’s and Griffith’s identification of a single institutional factor. This indicates that 
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in the case of British AR RLC and REME soldiers, there are two major institutional 
motivations for joining: experiencing military life, and serving one’s country/other. Some 
items (obtain educational benefits, overseas training and travel opportunities and be 
recognised and promoted) clearly loaded on different latent constructs than in Griffith’s 
study. As a result, the occupational – future oriented factor identified by Woodruff et al. and 
Griffith did not clearly emerge in its own right. While this is in part explained by slight 
changes to two questions due to differing aspects of service between the forces, the 
absence of comparable educational benefits offered under the US G.I. Bill is another 
potentially important explanatory factor 
Discussion 
This study significantly adds to the literature on the recruitment and retention in the British 
Army Reserve, and that on I-O motivations in general. The results highlight that most 
soldiers joined British reserve logistics units for institutional rather than occupational 
reasons. This has a number of implications for the recruitment and retention of reserve 
logistics personnel and the FR20 recruitment campaign in particular.  
What now for Army Reserve recruitment? 
A number of general trends emerge in the evidence which may be useful to inform future 
recruitment and retention policies concerning RLC and REME reservists. Firstly, there was 
no significant difference in RLC and REME soldiers’ motivations for joining reserve service, 
indicating that recruitment campaigns specifically targeting these different cap badges are 
not needed. Secondly, without controlling for any background characteristics, most RLC and 
REME soldiers join for institutional reasons. Those that do are generally associated with 
longer career intentions and reporting when mobilised for intrinsic reasons. They also attend 
training more frequently and are more satisfied with reserve service. Generally, they are less 
likely to leave service due to a lack of pecuniary benefits and conflicts with civilian life. This 
is consistent with previous research and the hypotheses. In terms of the success of FR20, 
this evidence suggests that institutionally-motivated soldiers could be more committed to the 
new demands of reserve service as outlined in the policy, and are more likely to remain in 
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service and deploy despite frictions, when compared to their occupationally-motivated 
colleagues. This is a potentially significant finding that has also been corroborated with 
interview data, given that current recruitment strategies are stressing the pecuniary benefits 
of reserve service. 
In terms of recruiting certain groups, it is noteworthy that lower ranked and less 
educated soldiers reported higher levels of joining for each of the institutional reasons. 
These are key groups the AR must recruit and retain if is to expand, and this evidence points 
to the enduring importance of institutional motivations for reserve service, despite the 
increasingly better occupational benefits on offer as a result of FR20. As a result, reserve 
recruitment campaigns emphasising the patriotic and experiential aspects of reserve service 
should resonate with potential RLC/REME recruits. Supporting the previous literature and 
the hypotheses, the evidence also suggests that soldiers who join for pecuniary benefits are 
less satisfied with all elements of reserve service, more likely to deploy due to contractual 
obligations and more likely to leave due to a lack of pecuniary benefits. In short, these 
soldiers are less committed to reserve service. 
Taken together, these broad trends suggests that recruitment campaigns that only 
stress the occupational and pecuniary benefits of reserve service may attract soldiers who 
will be less satisfied and committed and thus harder to retain. A similar argument was made 
by Griffith (2007). Indeed, a very recent qualitative study in a similar sample has also 
revealed concerns amongst RLC/REME reservists about both the long-term intentions and 
commitment of those that join for monetary benefits (including ex-Regulars), and the quality 
of recruit such a strategy has attracted. Given that recent AR recruitment campaigns that 
have focused heavily on the pay, bonus pay and material benefits of reserve service are now 
beginning to attract the numbers required under FR20, a more balanced approach to 
recruitment that also stresses the institutional and experiential benefits of reserve service is 
worthy of consideration. Certainly, appeals to patriotism could be accentuated.  
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In terms of retention, beyond the evidence that institutionally-motivated soldiers have 
longer career intentions and are more committed to reserve service, there is also a clear 
trend that better educated soldiers are harder to retain. Better educated soldiers were more 
likely to leave due to boring training and poor leadership, a lack of occupational development 
opportunities and conflicts with civilian life. Better educated soldiers were also less satisfied 
with the amount of training conducted with regulars. Better educated soldiers therefore 
represent the hardest single group of soldiers to retain, yet as 35 percent of the sample had 
some college education or above, efforts to improve levels of satisfaction within this group 
would be recommended. This is especially important as better educated soldiers conceivably 
will have higher levels of skill in the RLC and REME, and therefore need to be retained to 
deliver the increased capability required under FR20. As a result of this research, CD CSS 
has already identified that improving the amount of training with regulars is likely to have 
cross-cutting effects on satisfaction across both the RLC/REME population, and amongst 
better educated soldiers in particular: the findings are being used to inform future policy in 
this regard. Interestingly, one facet of FR20 may indirectly address this training issue as well. 
As the reserves are being deployed more regularly on defence engagement tasks they have 
greater opportunity to train with the regulars, and indeed, other armies. For some, especially 
better educated reservists, this may boost retention. 
In terms of the requirement for heightened reserve readiness, recently there have 
been signs that FR20’s emphasis on the routine deployment of reservists has been reviewed 
downward. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review outlined that the army should 
re-focus on its ability to deploy and sustain a warfighting division for a shorter intervention, 
thereby indicating a shift away from the deployment of brigades on enduring operations  
(Government, 2015, 31). As a result of this shift, the need to routinely deploy reservists 
appears to have diminished somewhat, as evidenced by recent comments by the Chief of 
the General Staff, Nick Carter (Carter, 2015). This adjustment may also have been a result 
of the organisational paradox that more deployable reserve meant a less recruited one. 
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Nevertheless, individual reservists are still viewed as an important contributor to the army’s 
operational readiness and resilience, and the evidence presented above indicates that those 
that join for institutional reasons are more committed to reserve service and more likely to 
deploy for intrinsic reasons. Griffith (2008) posited that these intrinsic motivations are most 
important for encouraging effective performance on deployment in often adverse conditions. 
This importance of intrinsic motivations was also supported in group interviews, where a 
number of reservists revealed issues with the reliance on monetary incentives in recruitment. 
As this reservist surmised: 
‘It's all well and good recruiting someone, but if they're: "Mmm... I don't know if I want 
to do it." You want someone who really wants to do it - like I really wanted to do it - 
then they'll do it. If they're half-hearted people, they will fall out, they won't want to do 
it. And there's not many people that I think that really want to do it. You have to think... 
I always look for the next challenge. That's what I do. That's how I am.’ (Group 
interview, 20 January 2016) 
Thus, the evidence seems to suggest caution about an over-reliance on monetary incentives 
to induce service in the reserves. Certainly, it remains to be seen if those new reservists and 
ex-regulars who have joined as a result of the new bonuses remain in service after their 
return of services has expired, and indeed, how often they volunteer for additional training 
activities and deployments vis a vis their institutionally-motivated colleagues.  
Finally, the research also identified that in the sample surveyed, British reserve 
logistics soldiers were proportionally more motivated to join for institutional reasons (76 
percent) than US National Guard soldiers (63 percent). This led to the creation of a second 
institutional factor in reasons for joining, which differs from the US example, and may reflect 
long-term differences between the ‘offer’ made to British and US reservists – such as the 
lack of comparable educational benefits – as much as it does greater intrinsic motivations in 
the UK. The fact that a second institutional factor emerged, coupled with the absence of a 
clear occupational – future oriented factor indicates that the I-O categories are more perhaps 
more fluid than previously thought, and that their prevalence can change with the sample.  
Study Limitations and Future Research 
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There were a number of study limitations. Firstly, although the sample was a statistically 
representative of the AR REME/ RLC population, and the response rate was very similar to 
those recorded in ResCAS, it did result in a relatively high confidence interval. Secondly, the 
adage ‘in science you get the answers to the questions you ask’ is noteworthy. Griffith’s and 
this paper have shown that the I-O model only explains about 25 percent of response 
variance. As a result the model does not come close to proving causality and is indicative of 
the wider problem of cross sectional studies of multi-dimensional and dynamic issues in the 
social sciences. Indeed, qualitative data gathered from conversations with AR officers have 
provided some more detailed explanatory factors that are not included in the model.3 
Similarly, although the evidence has been corroborated with group and individual interviews 
where appropriate, the predominant use of single quantitative instrument to assess these 
issues is another limit. Finally, the use of unstandardized B values precludes an accurate 
comparison of R2 variance scores.  
Further longitudinal research is needed to capture new recruits and ex-regulars who 
have joined since the introduction of FR20’s improved ‘offer’ to investigate whether they will 
remain in reserve service. Certainly this research would suggest that their retention could 
potentially becoming a problem once recruits have collected their joining bonuses and 
served their contractual requirement. More broadly, the question of whether better 
educational benefits, similar to those offered in the US, would increase recruitment and 
retention in the British AR is also worthy of investigation. Finally, this study has already 
directly resulted in the inclusion of I-O items on ResCAS, allowing comparisons to be drawn 
with all reservists in the future.  
                                                          
i In all EFAs and later analyses, missing values (average 3 percent per variable) were excluded pairwise. All 
factor extraction methods in this study used principal components with varimax rotation, and met both the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity requirements for 
factor analysis. All factor analyses used Catell’s Scree Test and parallel analysis to confirm the factors, and only 
examined the content of factors with loading > .30. For the reasons for joining EFA, the KMO was .819, and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was p =.000, indicating that factor analysis was appropriate. 
                                                          
3 I am particularly indebted to Lt Col. Vince Connelly and Capt. Alex Neads for their interpretations of the 
underlying reasons for some responses/findings. 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ii The overall chi-squared statistic (x2 (59) = 183.80, p <.000 was statistically significant. While this would 
usually result in a poor fit of the data to the specified model, the chi-squared statistic is influenced by larger 
sample sizes. Larger samples produce larger chi-squared values which are significant even when the data does 
fit the model. In such cases, as Griffith (2007) has noted, the ratio of chi-squared statistic to degrees of 
freedom is recommended. In this study, this ratio was 3.11. Ratios of 5.0 or less are considered a very good fit 
of data. The comparative fit index (CFI) was .94, over the .90 value requirement. The root mean standard error 
of approximation (RMSEA), which measures the extent to which the variance-covariance matrix derived from 
the data differed from that implied by the model was .060. The lower the RMSEA score, the better the ‘fit’ of 
the data. Scores of .050 are considered a good fit of data to the model, while scores up to .10 are considered 
an adequate fit. Finally, all standardised regression paths of items to their respective latent constructs were 
medium to large in size. Values ranged from .49 to .87 and the median score was .65.  
iii The KMO was .817, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was p =.000. An inspection of the screeplot revealed a 
clear break after the first, and another after the sixth factor. The choice of six factors was further supported by 
the results of Parallel Analysis (19 variables x 504 respondents). As the sample size was slightly too small to be 
fully confident of factor analysis results due to the high number of items (30 respondents per item is 
recommended) a further factor analysis was conducted using the only 15 highest scoring items. These results 
were very similar to those of the 19 items and generated six factors, supporting the statistical validity of the 
constructs. 
iv One question differed from Griffith’s study – soldiers were asked whether they reported because ‘they 
wanted to do their job on operations’ rather than they ‘believed in the mission’, and one question was added; 
mobilising ‘because you need the money’. 
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